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I. Introduction
A. Scope
This memorandum discusses whether the finality of the trial judgment can be sustained if
the Supreme Court Chambers of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
(“ECCC”) is unable to deliver a final appeals verdict due to the health of the Accused.
Specifically, this memorandum considers the Accused’s right to appeal as well as how the appeal
stage is seen as a continuation of the trial. Also discussed is the right to be presumed innocent
and when that presumption ends is discussed. The common law and civil law traditions in
regards to an Accused’s death pending direct appeal is also discussed. The fact that the ECCC is
a hybrid court, offers a unique insight into these issues, in particular, how the ECCC’s Supreme
Court Chambers could continue appeals notwithstanding the death of the Accused, thereby
allowing for a final appeal verdict.

B. Summary of Conclusions
a. The status of the trial judgment is entirely dependent on the action taken
against the appeal proceeding.
When an Accused files a notice of appeal, the trial judgment is suspended until a final
appeal verdict is reached. Generally, if an appeal proceeding is dismissed, meaning no final
appeal verdict is reached, the trial judgment can either stand or be vacated. Alternatively, the
appeal proceeding can be suspended. If the appeal proceeding is suspended, no final appeal



If an Accused dies or is found not fit to plead after a conviction at trial but before the final appeal verdict at the
ECCC what is the legal status of the conviction verdict at trial? (Context: Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan could die
or be found not fit to plead during the appeal process after being found guilty at trial. There is differing opinion as to
the legal status of the trial verdict. Some views are that the convicted person should be presumed innocent and
therefore not guilty; others say that the conviction status stands at the trial level.)
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verdict can be reached and the trial judgment remains suspended. The only way a final appeal
verdict can be reached is by allowing the appeal proceeding to continue.

b. The ECCC should not dismiss appeal proceedings if an Accused dies or
found unfit to plead before a final appeal verdict.
Allowing appeal proceedings to be dismissed goes against the purpose of the ECCC.
Given the hybrid nature of the ECCC, consideration to the approach taken by countries with
common law traditions may prove beneficial. The United States offers an especially interesting
insight into this issue considering there is a split among the states on how to address the death of
an Accused pending direct appeal.

c. The ECCC must allow appeal proceedings to continue if an Accused dies
before a final appeal verdict.
When the ECCC considers allowing the appeal proceeding to continue after the death of
the Accused, the court must balance the rights of the Accused with the interests of the victims
and the purpose behind the ECCC. The only way in which the ECCC can give equal
consideration to each of the parties involved is to allow the appeal proceeding to continue. To
ensure that the Accused is given that equal consideration, the ECCC can allow a substitute for
the deceased Accused who will be charged with representing the Accused’s interests through the
remainder of the appeal.

d. The ECCC should allow the appeal proceeding to continue if an Accused
is found unfit to plead before a final appeal verdict.
As a general rule, courts suspend the proceedings when the Accused is found to be not fit
to plead. This has been the practice that the ECCC has taken at the trial level. The Supreme
Court Chamber has ruled that the court maintains jurisdiction over the Accused even when the
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case is suspended indefinitely. This is a way for the court to maintain any hope in resuming the
proceedings if the Accused’s health were to improve. However, since such improvement is
unlikely given the advanced age of the Accused, in the interests of justice the court should allow
the appeal proceeding to continue with a substitute for the Accused.

II. Factual Background
A. Khmer Rouge and the purpose of the ECCC
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (hereinafter the “ECCC”) was
established in 2006 to “bring to trial senior leaders and those most responsible for crimes
committed during the time of Democratic Kampuchea, also known as the Khmer Rouge regime,
which lasted from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.”1 During that period, at least 1.7 million
people are believed to have died at the responsibility of these leaders, whether from starvation,
torture, execution or forced labour.2
The ECCC was established by domestic law following an agreement between the United
Nations and the Cambodian government. The Agreement between the United Nations and the
Royal Government of Cambodia of 2003 (hereinafter the “Agreement”) enumerates the
provisions that the ECCC must follow when it conducts a trial. Under Article 13 of the
Agreement, “the rights of the Accused enshrined in Articles 14 and 15 of the 1966 International

1

See ECCC at a Glance, available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%20Glance%20%20EN%20-%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source 66].
2

Id.
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [(hereinafter the “ICCPR”)] shall be respected throughout
the trial process.”3
The ECCC is part of the Cambodian court system and is considered a ‘hybrid’ tribunal
because of certain special features such as its ability to apply both national and international
law.4 The hybrid tribunal model is seen as a way to provide full national involvement in the trials
while at the same time ensuring that international standards are met.5 Under the Law on the
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (hereinafter “Establishment
Law”), the court “shall exercise [sic] its jurisdiction in accordance with the international
standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” 6 Under Article 14 of the ICCPR:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.…7

3

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution
Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Article 13, 6 June
2003, entered into force 29 April 2005, U.N. Doc. A/Res57/228B (Annex)(13 May 2003). [Electronic copy provided
in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 1].
4

5

See, ECCC at a Glance, supra note 1, [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 66].
Id.

6

Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Article 33, 27 October 2004
(NS/RKM/1004/006). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2].
7

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December 16, 1966, Article 14(1), B.A.
res. 2200A9XXI, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 7].
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Also, the Constitution of Cambodia explicitly incorporates international human rights
standards into the domestic framework, providing that “the Kingdom of Cambodia shall
recognize and respect human rights as stipulated in the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, [and] the covenants and conventions related to human rights,
women’s and children’s rights.”8 The Agreement and Establishment Law dictate that the
ECCC’s procedures must be “in accordance with Cambodian law,”9 with guidance from
international procedure where there is uncertainty in interpretation or there is a question of
consistency with international standards.10
The ECCC was designed within the existing court structure of Cambodia, but the ECCC
Trial Chamber has emphasized on several occasions that the ECCC is a “separately constituted,
independent and internationalized court,” with a “special and independent character within the
Cambodian legal system…designed to stand apart from existing Cambodian courts and rule
exclusively on a narrowly defined group of defendants for specific crimes within a limited
period.”11 The Court has also sought to distinguish the procedure used by the ECCC from the
domestic Cambodian procedure, stating that it has a “self-contained regime of procedural law [to
align with its] unique circumstances.”12 As observed by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Internal

8

Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia (1993), at Art. 31, as amended 15 February 2008. [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 4].
9

John D. Ciorciari and Anne Heindel, Experiments in International Criminal Justice: Lessons from the Khmer
Rouge Tribunal, 35 Mich. J. of Int’l L., at 7 (2014) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source 50]; (citing Agreement, Art. 12(1) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 1]
and Establishment Law, Arts. 20new, 23new, 33new.) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive
at Source 2].
10

Id.

11

Jessica Peake, A Spectrum of International Criminal Procedure: Shifting Patterns of Power Distribution in
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, 26 Pace Int’l L. Rev., at 223 (2014). [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 49].
12

Id.

14

Rules13 “form a self-contained regime of procedural law related to the unique circumstances of
the ECCC.”14 The Pre-Trial Chamber has also held that reference should be made to the Internal
Rules as the “primary instrument” where there is a conflict between the Internal Rules and the
Code of Criminal Procedure of the Kingdom of Cambodia (hereinafter “CCPC”).15
There is “nothing in the Establishment Law, the Agreement, or the Internal Rules that
requires ECCC judges to follow the jurisprudence or rules of procedure of the international
[tribunals]”.16 Therefore, the jurisprudence from the international tribunals is not binding on the
ECCC.17 However, considering that the controlling documents of the ECCC “explicitly
incorporate the protections of international human rights instruments, including the ICCPR, the
jurisprudence and rules of procedure of international tribunals can be used for guidance.”18
B. Case 002

13

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules (Rev. 9), as revised 16 January 2015.

14

Michael G. Karnavas, Bringing Domestic Cambodian Cases Into Compliance with International Standards, 3
Cambodia L & Policy Rev, at 9 (December 2014). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source 54].
15

Id.

16

Id., at 12

17

Id., at 13

18

Id.
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Case 002 is considered “the most important Khmer Rouge trial” because it involves the
two most senior leaders of the Democratic Kampuchea who are still alive:19 Nuon Chea20 and
Khieu Samphan.21 In August of 2014, the ECCC accomplished a major achievement with the
conviction of Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan in Case 002/01.22 Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan
were found to have committed various crimes against humanity.23 Nuon Chea and Khieu
Samphan have since appealed the Trial Chamber’s conviction in Case 002/01 and are currently
on trial in the second phase of Case 002.24 There is a growing concern over the health and fitness
of the Accused in this case, considering that the Accused are both in their late eighties.25

III. Fair Trial Concerns
19

Ieng Sary, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, died before a trial judgment in 2013
and the proceedings against him were thus terminated. See, Termination of the Proceedings against the Accused
Ieng Sary, Case File 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 14 March 2013. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 16]; Ieng Thirith, who held the position of Minister of Social Affairs and Action, was found
unfit to stand trial due to her dementia in 2011 which resulted in a stay of the proceedings against her until her death
in August 2015, upon which the proceedings were terminated. See, Termination of the Proceedings Against the
Accused Ieng Thirith, Case File 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 27 August 2015. [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 16].
20

Nuon Chea held important positions in the government including Chairman of the People’s Assembly and Acting
Prime Minister. He was the second most powerful member of the DK regime. See, Genocide: Who are the Senior
Khmer Rouge Leaders to be Judged? The Importance of Case 002, Searching for Truth and Justice, DC-CAM, at 2
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 68].
21

Khieu Samphan served as the head of state (President of the State Presidium) and Secretary of State for
Commerce, See Id., at 13
David Scheffer, What Has Been ‘Extraordinary’ About International Justice in Cambodia?, Cambodia Tribunal
Monitor, at 6 (25 February 2015) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 64].
22

23

Id.

25

The two remaining Accused have raised the issue of their individual fitness to stand trial in the past. See, Fourth
Decision on Fitness of the Accused Nuon Chea to Stand Trial, Case File 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 18 February
2015; [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 19]. Second Decision on Fitness of the
Accused Khieu Samphan to Stand Trial, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 18 February 2015. [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 18];
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In addressing the effect that the Accused’s death or unfitness would have on the trial
judgment, some issues relating to ensuring a fair trial must be considered.

A. The Right of Appeal
i. In General
The right to appeal is well established in international law.26 One of the primary functions
of the right of appeal is “to protect against miscarriages of justice.”27 One common way that such
miscarriages arise is when an Accused does not receive a fair trial. The appeals process is a way
for an Accused to address such an issue.28
Civil and common law systems differ in the way that the appeals proceeding is viewed. In
civil law systems, the appeals process is considered a continuation of the trial.29 Therefore, the
trial conviction is normally viewed as not being final until a final appeals verdict. In other words,
the appeals proceeding is simply the next step in the trial proceedings.30 Appeals in civil law
systems are typically heard de novo which means that the “evidence presented at trial may be

26

See Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 2,
Nov. 22, 1984, E.T.S. No. 117 (“Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to have
his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the grounds on which
it may be exercised, shall be governed by law.”); ICCPR, Art. 14(5), (“Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the
right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.”) [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 7].
Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 Duke J Comp & Int’l L., at 3 (2011)
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 56].
27

Id; There are other purposes behind criminal appeals, including: “maintaining consistency in trials;” “provid[ing]
legitimacy to the criminal justice system as a whole…[which in turn, increases]…public confidence in the
administration of justice;” and appeals “allow questions of law to be settled…[by providing]…a forum for ensuring
the proper interpretation, development and application of international law.” Id., at 3-4.
28

29

Id., at 15

30

Id., at 44
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reassessed, and often supplemented, at second instance.”31 In other words, the Appeals Court can
hear the trial “all over again.”32 In contrast, common law systems view the appeals process as a
means of review for the trial conviction. The appeal is considered to be corrective in nature, and
the Appeals Court is typically limited to considering issues of law that were raised on appeal.33

ii. At the ECCC
The ECCC is hybrid court that blends domestic law and international law, procedures,
and personnel.34 The ECCC was established as part of the Cambodian judicial system, meaning
that it is rooted in the civil law tradition.35 However, through practice, the ECCC has become a
court that resembles an international body.36 The ECCC has done this by applying a “mixture of
both civil and common law procedures, as well as procedures specific to the international law
tribunals.”37 So while the ECCC has its domestic roots in the civil law tradition, this has not
precluded the ECCC from incorporating elements from the common law tradition into the
structure and practice of its chambers. In fact, given the hybrid nature of the ECCC, the mixture

31

Id., at 22
Dr. Vivienne O’Connor, Practitioner’s Guide: Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, International Network to
Promote the Rule of Law, (March 2012), at 28 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
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of common law and civil law elements is unavoidable.38 The ECCC's Internal Rules have been
amended a number of times since its creation and, as Harry Hobbs put it, have “evolve[ed] from
a document that reflected Cambodian domestic procedure to a sui generis [(of its own kind,
unique)] beast that has been built to respond to the specific circumstances at the ECCC.”39
The Establishment Law requires that the ECCC shall exercise its jurisdiction “in
accordance with international standards of justice, fairness, and due process of law” as set out in
the ICCPR.40 Article 14(5) of the ICCPR guarantees that those convicted of a criminal offense
have the right to an appeal.41
The ECCC has three chambers; the Pre-Trial Chamber, the Trial Chamber, and the
Supreme Court Chamber (hereinafter “SCC”).42 The Establishment Law provides that the SCC
“shall serve as both appellate chamber and final instance.”43 In other words, the SCC has the
authority to decide appeals made by the Accused, the victims, or the Co-Prosecutors against
decisions, sentences, and other orders of the Trial Chamber.44 A party wishing to appeal a Trial
Chamber conviction must file a notice of appeal.45 The notice must put forth the grounds for

38

Id.

39

Harry Hobbs, Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings: Problems and Potential Solutions in
Implementing an Effective and Vital Component of Justice, 49 Texas Int’l L. J., at 19-20 (2014). [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 48].
40

Establishment Law, Art. 33 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2].

41

ICCPR, Art. 14(5) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 7].

42

See ECCC at a Glance, supra note 1 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 66].

43

Establishment Law, Art. 9new. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2].

44

Establishment Law, Art. 36new; [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2]. Also,
allowing appeals by the Prosecution is a hallmark of civil law systems. See Marshall, supra note 27, at [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 56].
45

Id.

19

each issue of appeal and it must specify the alleged errors.46 The SCC is bound by the confines
of the scope of the issues raised on appeal, which means that it does not treat the appeal as a
second chance to try the case.47 As opposed to the traditional civil law system Appeals Chamber,
the SCC serves more of a corrective nature.48 The Internal Rules provide that the grounds of
appeal to the SCC against a judgment of the Trial Chamber are “an error on a question of law
invalidating the judgment…or an error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”49
While the SCC cannot essentially retry the case on appeal, in determining whether an alleged
error occurred, the SCC may itself “examine evidence and call new evidence to determine [the]
issues.”50As the court of final instance, the SCC “shall make final decisions on both issues of law
and fact,” and it may not return the case to the Trial Chamber.”51

B. Presumption of Innocence
Since appeal proceedings are considered the next step in the trial process in civil law
systems, the requirements for a fair trial are also guaranteed at the appeal stage.52 For a trial to be
fair, “[it] need not be infallible, but it must give certain rights to the Accused.”53 The

46

Id.

Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Teething Phase of the ECCC, Chinese J. Int’l L, at 489 (2011). The SCC does not act
de novo, i.e. it does not try the case for a second time, which is the typical appeals process in civil law systems.
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 55].
47

48

Id.

49

ECCC Internal Rules (Rev.9), Rule 104(1) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source 3].
50

Id.

51

Establishment Law, Art. 36new [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 2].

52

Legal Digest of International Fair Trial Rights (2012), OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights, available at www.osce.org/odihr [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 47].
53

Shahabuddeen, supra note 47, at 472 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 55].

20

presumption of innocence is essential to a fair trial. The ICCPR states that “[e]veryone charged
with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.”54 Similarly, according to the Internal Rules of the ECCC, “[e]very person
suspected or prosecuted shall be presumed innocent as long as his/her guilt has not been
established.”55
Under international law, there is some dispute over when the presumption of innocence
ends. There is no universal answer to this question. Generally, countries with a civil law tradition
tend to hold that the presumption of innocence ends when there is a “final, i.e. unappeallable
judgment.”56 As the French King Louis XVI stated “the first of all principles in criminal
matters...is that a defendant, although having been convicted in trial and sentenced even to death,
is still deemed to be presumed innocent in the eyes of the law until the sentence is confirmed on
appeals trial.”57 On the other hand, common law countries predominantly consider the
presumption to end once the Accused has been convicted by the court of first instance.58 For
example, in the United States the presumption of innocence is understood to be extinguished
upon a trial conviction. In Ross v. Moffit, the court stated that there are
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[S]ignificant differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding.
The purpose of the trial stage from the State’s point of view is to convert a criminal
defendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt…By contrast, it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than the State, who initiates the
appellate process, seeking not to fend off the efforts of the State’s prosecutor but rather to
overturn a finding of guilt made by a judge or a jury below.”59
It remains unclear which position prevails in the jurisprudence of the international
tribunals.60 In Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, the ICTY Appeal Chamber held that the presumption
of innocence does not apply after the Accused is convicted at trial, even if there is an appeal
pending.61 This is similar to the common law system approach to appeals, which places the
burden of proving error of the trial judgment on the convicted appellant.62 But the ICTY has not
been consistent. In Prosecutor v. Simić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber rejected the Prosecution’s
argument that the Accused’s right to be presumed innocent was not applicable since the Accused
had already been convicted by the Trial Chamber.63 Rather than considering the Accused’s
conviction to be definitive, the Appeals Chamber reasoned that “the fact that the person has
already been sentenced is a matter to take into account when balancing the probabilities.”64
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The ECCC, through the Cambodian court structure, has a basis in the civil law tradition
which typically considers a conviction to be final upon the final appeal verdict.65 Thus, even
though an Accused has been convicted at trial, his or her guilt has not been established until a
final appeal verdict is reached. Only a criminal conviction that has become irrevocable removes
the right to the presumption of innocence.66 Therefore the Accused is presumed innocent
throughout the appeal proceeding.

IV. Law and Analysis
The death of an Accused pending direct appeal is a new issue before the ECCC as well as
the international community. There is little to no customary international law upon which the
ECCC can base its decision. Apart from one ICTY case, which will be discussed later in Part
IV(B)(i), the effect that death has on international court proceedings has been addressed only
when an Accused dies before a trial judgment is reached. Before addressing the issue at hand, it
is first important to mention how the death of an Accused is treated when the Accused dies
before a conviction at trial. For example, Cambodian courts extinguish the charges against the
deceased Accused.67 The international tribunals and the ECCC have elected to dismiss cases
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upon the death of an Accused.68 The rationale behind dismissing the case is that convicting a
deceased Accused would be a violation of his or her rights.69
Unlike before the Trial Chamber, where the death of an Accused means that the
proceedings cannot continue, death of an Accused pending direct appeal leaves the Appeals
Chamber in quite a different position.70 At the appeals stage, the Trial Chamber has issued a
judgment, and while it may not be considered the final judgment, it cannot be completely
disregarded.71 As stated by Timothy Razel, “the fact that [the conviction] has not been fully
appeal does not change the fact that an adjudication resulting in a verdict has taken place.”72
Therefore, the death of the Accused at the appeals stage of the trial should be addressed
differently than when the Accused dies prior to a trial judgment.
When the Accused dies before a final appeal verdict, there are two issues which must be
considered: “[f]irst, the Court must decide whether the proceedings should/could continue
despite the convicted person’s death; [s]econd, it must determine whether, in the event of
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termination of proceedings, the Trial Chamber’s judgment should be vacated or should retain
legal effect.”73

A. The status of the trial judgment is entirely dependent on the action taken against
the appeal proceeding.
At the ECCC, if an appeal is initiated, “the execution of the [trial] judgment shall be
suspended until the time limit for appeal has expired.”74 Upon the occurrence of an unavoidable
disruption of the appeal proceeding, such as the death of the Accused, the SCC must decide what
action must be taken regarding the appeal proceeding. In considering this issue, the case law
from the United States is particularly interesting to examine due to the fact that there is a split
among the states on how to address the death of an Accused during the appeal proceedings.75

i. If the appeal proceeding is dismissed, the trial judgment can either be vacated
or left to stand.
When an Accused dies before a final appeal verdict can be reached, the Appeals Chamber
can dismiss the appeal. Upon the dismissal of the appeal, the Appeals Chamber can elect to
either vacate the trial conviction or allow that trial conviction to stand. The practice differs
among states in civil and common law systems.76
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Courts that elect to dismiss the appeal as moot and vacate the trial judgment are adhering
to the abatement ab initio doctrine.77 Abatement means that the legal proceeding is dismissed or
discontinued “for a reason unrelated to the merits of the claim.”78 If the abatement doctrine is
applied ab initio, the appeal is dismissed as moot, the conviction is vacated and the indictment is
dismissed.79 This means that the Accused stands as if he or she had never been charged or
convicted in the first place. This is the approach taken when an Accused dies prior to a
conviction at trial. In regards to the death of an Accused pending direct appeal, this is the
approach typically taken by courts that have civil law traditions, but it is also the approach taken
by the majority of U.S. courts.80
On the other hand, courts can elect to abate the appeal, but nonetheless hold the trial
conviction to be final. In other words, this approach allows the Accused’s last court decision, i.e.
the trial conviction, to stand unchallenged.81 These courts reject the ab initio approach because
the abatement ab initio approach assumes the Accused’s appeal would have been successful.82
By upholding the conviction, these courts are operating under the assumption that after a
conviction at first instance, the presumption of innocence no longer applies to the Accused.83
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Thus, once an Accused is convicted, the presumption of innocence changes into a presumption
that the trial judgment is correct and because there is no living Accused to pursue an appeal and
challenge the trial conviction, the presumption that the conviction is correct stands. This is the
approach adopted by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić.84

ii. If the appeal proceeding is suspended indefinitely, the trial judgment is stayed
and has no effect.
When the appeal proceeding is suspended (or stayed), the trial conviction is denied a final
judgment and left suspended on the hopes that the proceeding will be able to continue in the
future. The SCC has ruled that the ECCC does not recognize a difference between a temporary
suspension and an indefinite suspension.85 The SCC held that the ECCC maintains that the
jurisdiction over the Accused and that any suspension or “stay” of a proceeding before the ECCC
is intrinsically impermanent.86 While the court maintains jurisdiction, the “stay” cannot be lifted
until the obstacle in the way of the appeal proceeding is resolved. Given that death cannot be
overcome, the proceedings would have no way of continuing. Denying any sort of resolution
would render the entire proceeding as being pointless and would seriously undermine the ECCC.

iii. If the appeal proceeding proceeds without disruption, or if the appeal is
allowed to continue following a disruption, a final appeal verdict can be
reached.
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The only way a final appeal verdict can be reached, thereby allowing the trial conviction
to come out of suspension, is if the appeal is perfected. If there is an obstacle in the way of the
appeal proceeding, the court can elect to continue with the appeal proceeding.

B. The ECCC should not dismiss appeal proceedings if an Accused dies before a final
appeal verdict.
i. Vacating the trial judgment is not an acceptable solution.
The ECCC should also not allow for the trial judgment to be vacated upon the death of
the Accused. Although this is the common practice of courts with civil law traditions,
“terminating the proceedings, given the judicial time, resources, and effort spent in the course of
the judicial process would adversely affect the communal justice interest.”87 The abatement ab
initio approach has substantial shortcomings, especially when considered in cases where serious
crimes are being tried.88 Vacating the judgment and abating the prosecution from its beginning
“undermines the adjudicative process and strips away any solace the victim or the victim's family
may have received from the appellant's conviction.”89
The majority of U.S. federal and state courts adhere to the doctrine of abatement ab
initio, meaning that when an Accused pending direct appeal, “the entire criminal prosecution,
including the conviction, is abated.”90 One of the rationales behind this doctrine is that once the
Accused dies, the Accused is no longer able to exercise his right to appeal.91 In the case of State
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v. Griffin, the Supreme Court of Arizona reasoned that the “death or the defendant renders
enforcement of the judgment impossible” and that abatement ab initio is the proper course of
action.92 The Griffin court also postulated that the “state has no substantial interest in attempting
to maintain the conviction [of a deceased defendant] so the entire criminal proceeding [should]
abate from the beginning.”93
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has held that when a defendant dies pending
his or her appeal, “further consideration of such a case by the courts is pointless because an
affirmance of the conviction would not enable the State to execute the judgment against the
deceased.”94 The Morris court paid due consideration to the family of the deceased defendant
and noted that they have “an interest in preserving, unstained, the memory of the deceased
defendant or his reputation” and that this interest provides a legitimate reason “to require that a
judgment of conviction not be permitted to become a final and definitive judgment of record
when its validity or correctness has not been finally determined…”95 Courts who adopt the
abatement ab initio approach rely heavily on the idea that a “conviction that [has not and] cannot
be tested by appellate review is both unreliable and illegitimate.”96 By following this approach,
courts are placing an emphasis on the rights of the Accused. Another rationale behind the
abatement ab initio approach is that once an appeal is initiated, the trial conviction loses its
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finality until the appeal is resolved.97 Courts that follow this approach hold that without a
resolution, the conviction “should not be permitted to stand when the defendant's death prevents
the appellate court from adjudicating the validity of the conviction.”98
Giving such little deference to the interests of the victims goes against a major innovation
of the ECCC. One of the defining characteristics of the ECCC is that victims have an increased
role in the trial process, even allowing the victims to be represented as a party to the trial.99
Abatement ab initio has significant legal consequences when it comes to the interests of the
victims.100 If a conviction no longer exists, it cannot be used in any civil action related to the
criminal activity, such as reparations. Also, the victims at the ECCC are not just victims of any
criminal proceeding, rather they are victims of violent and heinous crimes against humanity.
Abating a proceeding ab initio at the ECCC would be offensive to both the victims and the
Cambodian society at large.101 Vacating the trial conviction can also have a negative effect on
the deceased Accused and his or her his loved ones. It is important to note that adhering to the
abatement ab initio doctrine does not equate to a finding of innocence. Rather, it makes it as if
the Accused had never been charged with the crime in the first place. While there will never be
any legal finding of guilt once a case is abated, this does not remove the assumption of guilt from
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the court of public opinion. It is plausible that the family of the Accused would not be satisfied
with this approach as it would deny opportunity to clear the Accused’s name.102
ii. Following the precedent set by the ICTY’s Delić and allowing the trial judgment to
stand is not an acceptable solution.
In Prosecutor v. Rasim Delić, the ICTY Appeal Chamber addressed the issue of an
Accused dying after a trial conviction but before a final appeal verdict for the first time. The
Appeals Chamber, after receiving notification that Delić had died while on provisional release,103
held that the appeal proceeding should be dismissed and that the trial judgment was to stand.104 It
was the opinion of the Appeals Chamber that “nothing can undermine the finality of the Trial
Judgment.”105 The Appeals Chamber summarized its argument as follows:
First, the personal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to "natural persons," which, read
in the context and in light of the Statute's object and purpose, should be understood in its
ordinary meaning, i.e., the living.
Second, Article 25 of the Statute clearly states that "[t]he Appeals Chamber shall hear
appeals from persons convicted by the Trial Chambers or from the Prosecutor," thus
leaving no room for other persons interested in the outcome of the appeal.
Third, neither the Statute nor the Rules allow for Tribunal's jurisdiction in relation to any
procedures initiated by the convicted person's heirs or victims. The Appeals Chamber is
of the view that this clearly demonstrates that the Tribunal's jurisdiction ratione personae
is limited to living Accused or convicted persons.106
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The Appeal Chamber’s decision in Delić does not carry over to the ECCC for a variety of
reasons. At the ECCC, the final appeal verdict is needed in order to validate the Trial Chamber’s
conviction.107 The ECCC, having its roots in the civil law system, does not consider a judgment
to be final without a final appeal verdict. This is evidenced by the fact that the ECCC considers
fair trial rights, like the presumption of innocence to apply throughout the appeal proceeding.108
If the appeals process is necessary to validate and enforce the Trial Chamber’s conviction, then it
“cannot be said that an Accused who has died pending a rightful appeal has truly been
convicted.”109 In other words, the appeals process is necessary to render an Accused “confirmed
in guilt.”110 This view is consistent with the finding in the European Court of Human Rights’
(ECHR) case of Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany.111 In Nölkenbockhoff, the ECHR held that “[t]he
principle of the presumption of innocence is intended to protect ‘everyone charged with a
criminal offence’ from having a verdict of guilty passed on him without his guilt having been
proved according to law.”112 Therefore, holding the trial conviction to be final upon the death of
the Accused “cannot be reconciled with the meaning and effects of the presumption of innocence
under internationally recognized human rights.”113
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The Appeal Chamber in Delić failed to take into account the Accused’s right to an
appeal. Delić disregards the presumption of innocence by holding it to end once the Accused is
convicted at trial. Also, allowing convictions to stand without being fully adjudicated
undermines the purpose of international criminal justice. As said by the court in Gollot v. State,
“leaving convictions intact without review…potentially leaves errors uncorrected which will
ultimately work to the detriment of…[the]…justice system.”114 Such unreviewed convictions are
“hollow” and lack the full adjudication that society requires.115
Finally, the decision in Delić cannot be adopted by the ECCC because the ECCC Internal
Rules do provide for a situation that can be initiated by someone related to the deceased
Accused. Rule 112 allows for post mortem initiation of revision proceedings.116 The language of
this rule suggests that certain legal interests continue beyond death, or are at least can be passed
on to the family of the convicted person.117 In light of Internal Rule 112, granting a comparable
standing for the initiation and continuation of appeal proceedings to family members of the
deceased Accused would “neither seem unwarranted, nor impracticable.”118
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The approach taken by the ICTY in Delić has also been adopted by a minority of U.S.
courts.119 These courts allow for the abatement of the appeal, but nonetheless refuse to abate the
trial judgment and instead hold the conviction and sentence to be final.120 In State v. Korsen, the
Supreme Court of Iowa, in rejecting the abatement ab initio approach, observed that abating the
conviction “would deny the victim of the fairness, respect, and dignity guaranteed [to them by
law]…by preventing the finality and closure they [were] designed to provide.”121
While the interests of victims must be given due consideration, it cannot be done at the
expense of the Accused’s rights. As stated by Salvatore Zappala, “no truth can be reached
without full respect of the rights of the accused.”122 On the other hand, the rights of the Accused
cannot be preserved at the frustration of the victims’ interests. Both of the abatement approaches
calls for the abatement, i.e. dismissal, of the appeal proceedings. As shown above, dismissal of
the appeal proceeding results in a situation that conflicts with the ECCC Internal Rules which
states that proceedings shall be fair, adversarial, and shall preserve a balance between the rights
of the parties.123

C. The ECCC must allow the appeal proceeding to continue if an Accused dies before a
final appeal verdict.
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i. In order for the appeal proceeding to continue, the ECCC can allow for a
substitute for the deceased Accused.
1. The “Substitution Approach” is seen in common law systems.
Although the majority of U.S. federal and state courts adhere to the abatement ab initio
approach, a growing number of courts are allowing appeal proceedings to continue with a
substitute for the deceased Accused.124 This “substitution approach” is seen as the middle ground
between the two abatement approaches.125 This approach allows both the rights of the accused
and the victims’ interest to be considered.
In State v. Makaila, the Hawaiian Supreme Court recognized that the interests of each
party need to be given equal consideration.126 The Makaila court held,
[u]pon the death of a criminal defendant pending appeal, it seems unreasonable to
automatically follow the abatement ab initio rule and pretend that the defendant was
never indicted, tried, and found guilty. Similarly, outright dismissal of the appeal-without
the possibility of a review of the merits-seems equally unacceptable.127
The Makaila court also held that any appropriate party, including the State, could move for
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substitution of the deceased.128 However, the court emphasized that this is a discretionary
approach and that if the court is not satisfied, the appeal and conviction should be abated.129
In Salazar, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the court can appoint a substitute
on its own initiative, but that this should only be done when “ continuing [the] appeal will not
prejudice [the] rights or interests of the deceased, and if [continuing the] appeal would be in the
best interests of decedent’s estate, remaining parties, or society.”130 The court also held that the
death of the Accused has “no effect on [the court’s] handling of the issues.”131 Similarly, the
Carlin court held that even after an Accused’s death, there may remain a “present, live
controversy.”132 Often, there will be a financial component, such as restitution, to a criminal
judgment, and the appeal will thus have financial consequences for the defendant's estate.133 As
stated by the McDonald court, the Accused’s interests, as well as the legal system itself, support
allowing the appeal to continue.134 The Wisconsin Supreme Court further held that the right to

128

Id. See also, State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E. 2d 378, at 382-83 (Ohio 1987) (The Supreme Court of Ohio stated that
the deceased Accused’s attorney of record could serve as a sufficient substitute. The court also held that
“[s]ubstitution allows a case already adjudicated at the trial level to follow a natural progression through the
appellate process even without the defendant’s presence.”) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source 39]
129

Id.

130

State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996, at 1000 (N.M 1997). [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive
at Source 41]
131

Id., at 1004-05; See also Gollot v. State 646 S0.2d 1297 (Determined that full review of the appeal was the only
way to both preserve the presumption that the conviction is valid until over turned on appeal and preserving the
defendant’s right to appeal.) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 30]
132

249 P.3d 752 (Ala. 2011), at 764 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 32]

133

Id.

134

424 N.W. 2d 411 (Wis. 1988) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 38]; This
idea can be explained by the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin: It is not [defendant's] appeal
which is moot, as the dissent would have it, but rather it is his death which is moot, because he did not take the
potential errors of our justice system into the grave with him. These potential errors remain behind to perplex and
confound his relatives, friends, reputation, and the legal system. Id., at 45 (cited by State v. Carlin, 249 P.3d 752,
764-65 (Alaska 2011), [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 32]

36

appeal “is an integral part of a defendant’s right to final determination of the merits of the
case…[and a] defendant who dies pending appeal…is no less entitled to those safeguards.”135
One criticism of the “substitution approach” is that a criminal appeal is personal to the
Accused and thus should die with him or her.136 However, as stated in R. v. Smith, the Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction can continue if “the notice of appeal…was properly filed during the
appellant’s lifetime” and that “an appellant exercises his or her ‘personal right’ to appeal when
the notice of appeal is filed.”137 Thus, the Canadian court concluded that the filing is “the root of
the appellate court’s jurisdiction.”138
2. The “Substitution Approach” is appropriate for the ECCC
As discussed above, the ECCC has its basis in the civil law tradition. Interestingly
enough, the majority approach by civil law systems to address the death of the Accused pending
direct appeal mirrors the majority approach in the United States, abatement ab initio.139
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However, given the strong emphasis of victim participation at the ECCC, following the
“substitution approach” would not be unwarranted. As mentioned above, it should be noted that
this is a discretionary standard.140 If the interests of justice do not call for the continuation of the
proceedings, then the court should dismiss the appeals proceedings. However given the situation
faced by the ECCC, i.e. the advanced ages of the Accused, the interests of justice certainly for
the continuation of appeal proceedings.

ii. The interests of justice calls for the appeals proceeding to continue.
1. The ECCC already has a limited right to appeal.
Allowing the appeal to continue is warranted due to the fact that the ECCC, as a twotiered court structure, already results in a limited right of appeal when compared to Cambodia
and the international tribunals. The SCC is the court of final instance at the ECCC. All
judgments by the SCC are final, meaning that the SCC may “confirm, annul or amend decisions
[of the Trial Chamber] in whole or in part,” but the SCC cannot remit the case to the Trial
Chamber.141 This represents a significant departure from the civil law system that the ECCC has
its roots in, as is evidenced by the fact that Cambodia has a three-tiered structure.142 This also
represents a sharp difference from the international tribunals. As provided by the rules of the
ICTY and ICC, the Appeals Chamber has the discretion to remit cases to the Trial Chamber.143
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As Lily O’Neill puts forth, the ability to send a case back to the Trial Chamber or court of first
instance to be retried is another way to protect and ensure that the Accused has the right to
appeal.144 Having the option to remit the case back to the Trial Chamber grants the “Appeals
Chambers the discretion to guarantee the right of appeal.”145The SCC is the only chance the
Accused has for appeal, making the assurance of the right to appeal even more essential. Not
allowing the appeal to continue would amount a violation of the right to appeal as stated in the
ICCPR.146 The ECCC, in “the cause of truth and justice” should rule in favor of allowing a
substitute for the Accused being afforded the same opportunity to clear the Accused’s name,
“which only the intervention of death has prevented the Accused himself from pursuing.”147

2. Given the advanced age of the Accused, allowing the appeal to continue is
the only way the purposes of the ECCC, the rights of the Accused, and
the interests of the victims can be given equal consideration.
Once the appeal is properly constituted with a live appellant (by substituting a party for
the deceased Accused), the ECCC must then consider whether to exercise its jurisdiction to hear
the appeal despite it being rendered moot by the death of the Accused.148 Generally, courts do
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not like to consider cases that would have no effect149, but sometimes it is warranted by the
circumstances, the court may elect to address a moot issue.150 The SCC’s exercise of discretion
to continue proceedings in the interests of justice may be guided by the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada set out several factors that the court can
consider to determine “whether there exists special circumstances that make it ‘in the interests of
justice’ to proceed.”151 For example, the court can consider “whether there are special
circumstances that transcend the death of the individual appellant” such as “collateral
consequences to the family of the deceased or to the other interested persons or to the
public…”152 Another reason to consider a moot appeal is that “a moot appeal may also raise
questions about systemic failures in the justice system…which transcend the interests of the
immediate parties…and may justify the continuation of the appeal…153 The Court further
concluded that:
What is necessary is that, at the end of the day, the court weigh up the different factors
relevant to a particular appeal, some of which may favour the continuation and others not,
to determine whether in the particular case, notwithstanding the general rule favouring
abatement, it is in the interests of justice to proceed.154
Before the ECCC, all of the factors favor the continuation of the appeal. As stated above,
Case 002 is considered “the most important Khmer Rouge trial” because it involves the two most
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senior leaders of the Democratic Kampuchea who are still alive.155 Failing to reach a resolution
in Case 002 would seriously undermine the purpose behind the establishment of the ECCC. And
while this interest does not transcend the interests of the parties involved, it must be considered
in relation to these interests. After examining different approaches to the death of an Accused
pending appeal, it is obvious that the “substitution approach” is the only approach that gives
equal consideration to all parties involved. The ECCC was clearly established with an intent to
provide more consideration to victims’ interests and the “substitution approach” acknowledges
that intent by allowing a final adjudication of the case thereby giving the victims closure as well
as the opportunity for reparations.156 The “substitution approach” declines to automatically
abatement a conviction, but acknowledges the rights of the deceased Accused by allowing
another party to pursue the Accused’s right to appellate review.157 This approach “allows for a
fair compromise between the competing interests at issue, the rights of the Accused and the
interests of the victims.”158 Allowing the appeal to continue also satisfies the interests of the
ECCC and the greater international community by the fact that “the case is presumably resolved
in the same manner and reached the same final result as would have been the case had the
Accused lived to exercise is right to appeal.”159 The “substitution approach” allows the ECCC to
respect the rights of the Accused and the victims, while also allowing it to provide justice by
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bringing to trial those “most responsible.” As summarized in R. v. Whelan, the duty to truth and
justice “is unaffected by the death of the deceased…where only the intervention of death has
prevented the defendant himself from pursuing the appeal.160

D. The ECCC should allow the appeals proceedings to continue if an Accused is found
not fit to plead before a final appeal verdict.
i. The SCC does not recognize a difference indefinite suspensions.
The question of how to deal with Accused unlikely to ever become fit to stand trial is, as put
by the SCC, complex.161 The issue “creates a tension between the fundamental rights of the
Accused on the one hand (e.g. to be presumed innocent and to be tried within a reasonable time,
as well as the rights to liberty and privacy) and the interests of justice on the other hand (e.g. in
prosecuting the Accused for serious crimes), including the interests of the victims to have the
truth ascertained and pursue their civil claims.”162 The SCC has affirmed that “[i]t remains
exceptional that proceedings against permanently unfit Accused are terminated and that courts
forfeit jurisdiction over them, especially in cases involving serious crimes.”163 The SCC
concluded that the Court’s jurisdiction over the Accused does not cease, due to the possibility, no
matter how remote, that the proceedings could still plausibly continue.164 The SCC further
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clarified that any stay in proceedings within the ECCC is inherently impermanent and
conditional, for the duration of an obstacle.165

ii. Suspending the appeal proceeding indefinitely and thereby leaving no final
verdict on the trial judgment is not an acceptable solution.
The option of suspending the appeal proceedings with no final determination of the
Accused’s guilt (or innocence) makes little sense in the context of the ECCC. The requirement
that the Accused be fit to stand trial is “intimately associated with minimum international fair
trial standards,”166 and is a requirement that the ECCC has promised to uphold. Although the
SCC held that a permanent stay is not “a disproportionate infringement upon the Accused’s
fundamental rights,”167 there remains some cause for concern. As argued above, the only way to
provide due consideration to all parties involved (as well as the purpose behind the ECCC) is to
allow for a final adjudication of the appeal. The same rationale applies in the case of a mentally
unfit Accused. By allowing a guardian or personal representative to substitute for the unfit
Accused in remaining appeal proceedings, the SCC would be further ensuring that the rights of
the Accused and his survivors are protected by encouraging full and final adjudication of the
case.168

V. Conclusion
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The ECCC should function in a way that is consistent with its unique structure and its
overall purpose. The ECCC has an explicit purpose—to prosecute “senior leaders and those most
responsible.” The ECCC also has a duty to carry out this prosecution through a fair trial. And
while ensuring a fair trial is typically thought of as a right guaranteed to the Accused, it also
extends to victims.169 When an Accused dies or is found to be unfit before a final appeal verdict
is reached, justice should be considered in two respects; justice for the deceased Accused and
justice for the victims. Not allowing a full adjudication of an appeal can only result in the
disregard of one parties’ interest in favor of the other. The balancing of the interests of the
victims against the rights of the Accused represents an adherence to the “backbone of
international criminal procedure: the presumption of innocence [and] the right to a fair [trial] in
full.170 The “substitution approach” is the only way that the interests of the Accused and the
victims can be balanced while giving consideration to the overall purpose of the ECCC. As
summarized by Tim Staggs, “[a]pellate all or nothing is unfair to everyone.”171
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